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330 Abstract
The objective of this paper is to determine possible indicators that affect local unit 
credit risk and investigate their effect on default (credit risk) of local government 
units in Croatia. No system for the estimation of local unit credit risk has been 
established in Croatia so far causing many practical problems in local unit bor-
rowing. Because of the speciﬁ  c nature of the operations of local government units 
and legislation that does not allow local government units to go into bankruptcy, 
conventional methods for estimating credit risk are not applicable, and the set of 
standard potential determinants of credit risk has to be expanded with new indi-
cators. Thus in the paper, in addition to the usual determinants of credit risk, the 
hypothesis of the inﬂ  uence of political factors on local unit credit risk in Croatia 
is also tested out, with the use of a Tobit model. Results of econometric analysis 
show that credit risk of local government units in Croatia is affected by the poli-
tical structure of local government, the proportion of income tax and surtax in 
operating revenue, the ratio of net operating balance, net ﬁ  nancial liabilities and 
direct debt to operating revenue, as well as the ratio of debt repayment and cash, 
and direct debt and operating revenue. 
Keywords: credit risk, local government units, Tobit model, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
Do local units of self-government1 have the capacity to borrow? For an answer to 
this question, it is necessary to establish a system for the evaluation of the credit 
risk of local units. Numerous theoretical and empirical research works speak am-
ply of the importance of this problem. Competent government bodies – before 
they give guarantees for local unit borrowing – need to evaluate the credit risk of 
local units. In some countries, such as Mexico, a credit risk evaluation system has 
become an integral part of the institutional framework for local unit borrowing 
(Liu and Tan, 2009). There are several possible factors contributing to the impo-
rtance of the estimation of local unit credit risk. They include ﬁ  scal decentralisa-
tion, the development of a market-oriented borrowing policy, a wish to augment 
creditworthiness, a search for better borrowing conditions and the strengthening 
of the legislative framework (Gaillard, 2009)2.
1 Below, the term local units will be used. 
2 Apart from the legislative framework, which is directed to the establishment of fiscal discipline at the local 
level, the regulation of the banking system in recent time contributes to the ever-greater importance of the 
assessment of local unit credit risk. Although the initial capital agreement (Basel I) of 1988 determined the 
basic parameters for risk management and capital adequacy, the Basel II regulatory framework gives detailed 
guidelines for the calculation of capital requirements (particularly for credit and operating risk). The first pillar 
of the Basel II regulatory framework (minimum capital requirements) sets the rules for computing credit risk 
through: (a) the standardised approach; (b) the foundation internal rating based approach; and (c) the advanced 
internal rating based approach. Each of these approaches serves, ultimately, to calculate capital requirements 
(what the banks have to set aside to cover risks of exposure to given loans). At the bottom of the calculation of 
capital requirements is the likelihood of default (credit risk) for each individual loan or debtor. In accord with this 
banks that – in any way at all – loan money to local units should have at their disposal (in the context of calcu-
lation of capital requirements) information about the credit risk associated with local government units.P
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331 There is no system in Croatia for estimating local unit credit risk. Because of the 
absence of any information about local unit credit risk, it is hard to identify the 
successful local units and put them forward as good examples (Bajo and Primorac, 
2009). Indirectly, the work of the Ministry of Finance in the assignment of conse  nts 
and guarantees for local unit borrowing is made more difﬁ  cult. One of the reasons 
for the non-existence of credit risk evaluation is the poor and undeveloped market 
for local bonds, local units thus being more apt to borrowing by loans with govern-
ment guarantees. It is often superﬁ  cially considered that local units are not risky 
debtors because the government gives guarantees for their borrowings. However, 
the existence of outstanding liabilities of local units indicates that they are not enti-
rely prompt in settling their obligations. Although the claims of creditors are relati-
vely safe, it is dubious how soon they will be able to collect. Since credit risk refers 
to the risk of claims either not being met at the due date or not being met in full, or 
both, every failure to meet the date of maturity can be characterised as realisation of 
credit risk. The Croatian Bankruptcy Law (OG 44/96, Art. 3, Para. 2) does not allow 
local units to go into bankruptcy although some local units’ bank accounts are quite 
often frozen because of their failure to meet their liabilities. Although the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has resulted in a considerable diminution of the ﬁ  nancial credibility of local 
units in Croatia, the insolvency of some cities even before the crisis conﬁ  rms that 
this problem is present to a greater or lesser degree quite independently of economic 
circumstances. The reasons why Croatian cities’ accounts were frozen between 
2005 and 2011 include: failure to settle liabilities to suppliers (Ploče and Biograd); 
claims of banks arising out of loans they have made (Zlatar); invoked guarantees 
(Trogir); claims of the Ministry of Finance arising from claims for income tax re-
funds (Osijek); claims of proprietors for conﬁ  scated land (Dubrovnik) and so on. 
The city of Slavonski Brod shows that local unit insolvency can have much more 
serious consequences than account-freezing. Because the city was unable to meet 
its ﬁ  nancial liabilities, its assets were sold at auction.
The credit risk of local units is on the whole not higher than the sovereign ceiling. 
Bearing in mind that central government will usually guarantee that the local units 
will meet their liabilities when the loans are being taken out, credit risk should not 
be much lower, either. However, the diverse status of local units within some state, 
the differences in ﬁ  scal capacities, population size and inadequately deﬁ  ned rules 
for the allocation of tax revenue and many other factors indicate considerable 
differences in their ﬁ  nancial stability (Carnevale and Coulton, 2006).
The objective of the paper is to ascertain the indicators that to the greatest extent 
determine the credit risk of local units and to investigate their impact on the credit 
risk of local units in Croatia. The paper, then, tests out the hypothesis of the effect 
of different indicators on local unit credit risk in Croatia. Part two of the paper 
provides a theoretical framework for the evaluation of credit risk and an explana-
tion of the selection of the appropriate method for evaluation. Part three describes 
the variables that might inﬂ  uence the credit risk of local units. Part four has a de-
scription of the model and the results of econometric analysis. In this part, the P
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332 parameters of the model are evaluated and the comparison of the model predicted 
and evaluated (real) value of credit risk is presented. Part ﬁ  ve contains conclu-
sions and recommendations for further research.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The evaluation of credit risk in academic and specialised literature appeared with 
much more seriousness in the middle of the 20th century. Yet in spite of the pro-
gress made by economic science, so far no consensus has been attained conce-
rning the best methodology or the set of indicators (input variables) that ought to 
be used for an evaluation of the credit risk of a given group of debtors.
In the ﬁ  rst papers concerning credit risk evaluation, authors attempted to predict 
debtor bankruptcy by using discriminant analysis (Altman, 1968; Carleton and Ler-
ner 1969, as well as, Raman, 1981) and regression analysis (Hastie, 1972; Ohlson, 
1980 and Zmijewski, 1984; Lewis, Patton and Green, 1988 and Anderson, 2007). A 
little earlier, Fisher (1959) used regression analysis for the investigations of the de-
terminants of risk premiums on corporate bonds. Henley and Hand (1996) used clu-
ster analysis (nearest neighbour method) and in recent times the more contemporary 
approaches of estimating risk by the application of neural networks (Odom and Sharda, 
1990) and the genetic algorithm (Shin and Han, 1999; Shin and Lee, 2002; Ong, 
Huang and Tzeng, 2005), as well as support vectors (Huang et al., 2004) and fuzzy 
logic (Wang, Wang and Lai, 2005 as well as Hájek and Olej, 2007) have been used. 
TABLE 1
Traditional approaches to the evaluation of credit risk
Method Authors
Discriminant analysis Altman (1968), Carleton and Lerner (1969), Raman (1981)
Linear regression (OLS) Hastie (1972), West (1970), Fisher (1959)
Logit
Ohlson (1980), Lewis, Patton and Green (1988), Ederington 
(1985)
Probit
Zmijewski (1984), Jackson and Boyd (1988), Gentry, Whit-
ford and Newhold (1988)
Cluster analysis
Henley and Hand (1996), Chatterjee and Barcun (1970), Hájek 
and Olej (2006)
Genetic algorithm
Shin and Han (1999), Shin and Lee (2002), Ong, Huang and 
Tzeng (2005)
Neural network 
Odom and Sharda (1990), Piramuthu (1999), Baesens et al. 
(2003)
Support vector method  Huang et al. (2004), Min and Lee (2005)
Fuzzy logic Wang, Wang and Lai (2005), Hájek and Olej (2007)
Note: Practical problems in the process of risk evaluation and continuous advances in research in this area 
have resulted in the persistent appearance of new, more contemporary evaluation models, among which 
there are structural models (KMV Credit Monitor and the hybrid Moody’s RiskCalc), intensity-based or 
reduced form models (KPMG Loan Analysis System and Kamakura Risk Manager), value at risk models 
(Credit Metrics and Algorithmic Mark-to-Future) as well as mortality rate models (Credit Risk Plus).
Source: Authors’ systematisation.P
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333 The ﬁ  rst papers on local unit credit risk appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Carleton 
and Lerner (1969), right at the end of the sixties, with their scoring model tested 
the effects of institutional organisational structure, population, various indebte-
dness indicators, and rate of tax collection of local units on their credit ratings. 
Hastie (1972) studied the inﬂ  uence of a somewhat larger group of independent 
variables (indebtedness, economic diversiﬁ  cation, population growth and so on) 
on the yields of municipal bonds. Wallace (1981) considered the correlation of 
accounting indicators with borrowing costs; Ingram and Copeland (1982) expan-
ded Wallace (1981) by using other variables; Benson, Marks and Raman (1984) 
examined the correlation of government regulation of accounting procedures and 
the costs of local unit borrowing. Capeci (1991, 1994) bore out the contention that 
the operating characteristics of local units are an important determinant of credit 
risk and indirectly of the yields on local unit bonds. A large number of recent re-
searches Gaillard (2009), Lipnick, Rattner and Ebrahim (1999), Liu and Tan 
(2009) have conﬁ  rmed the impact of different indicators of local units on their 
credit risk.
The credit risk of local units depends on numerous factors that, in principle, can 
be divided into a few groups. They are institutional framework, economic structu-
re, governance and administration, ﬁ  nances and the budget and liquidity and long-
term liabilities (Gaillard, 2009; Lipnick, 1999; and Liu and Tan, 2009). Pursuant 
to an analysis of indicators grouped into the individual sets, it is possible to quan-
tify their impact on local unit credit risk. Although numerous academic investiga-
tions have tried to answer the question of which variables have the greatest impact 
on local unit credit risk, the fullest list of potential factors was nevertheless engen-
dered by the practical implementation of the process of evaluating credit risk. 
Credit rating agencies Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings systema-
tised a list of indicators used during their estimation of local unit credit risk (ap-
pendix 1). Many of the determinants of credit risk actually reﬂ  ect the speciﬁ  c 
features of individual countries and their institutional frameworks, and there is 
still not a single, generally accepted evaluation criterion.
This paper will examine not only the usual credit risk indicators but also the effect 
of one of such speciﬁ  c variables on the local unit credit risk in Croatia. In general, 
it is thought that a local unit is less risky if the share of its own sources of revenue 
in total income is greater. Accordingly, local units that rely to a large extent on 
unstable sources of income (intergovernmental transfers) are riskier. The problem 
of the allocation of aid funding to local units is particularly complex if the political 
aspects are taken into consideration. Numerous investigations from the end of the 
last century considered the interdependence of political economy and the alloca-
tion of aid. In the course of time two prevailing theories developed. Cox and 
McCubbins (1986), the founders of one of them, think that the ruling structure 
(central government) in its allocation of transfers privileges those local units in 
which it has political support (i.e. local units with a politically compatible gover-P
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334 nment). An alternative theory, the main representatives of which are Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1998), says that funding from the cen-
tral budget is allocated to local units in which voter preferences are variable, i.e. 
local units in which swing voters predominate. Although it is still not clear which 
of these two theories is more correct, the issue of the effect of political factors on 
the allocation of aid from the central government budget to local units is an aca-
demic problem from the domain of political economy. Therefore, this paper will 
endeavour to ascertain if there is any inﬂ  uence from political factors on local unit 
credit risk in Croatia.
3 DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RISK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
In Croatia there is no instrument for local government unit bankruptcy, as there is 
in some countries (in Hungary, for example), because of which the standard eva-
luation of credit risk on the basis of historical values of bankruptcy that either 
came about or did not come about (binary variable – dichotomous) is not possible. 
Hence, credit risk has to be approximated in some other way. Credit risk can be 
characterised as the risk of a debtor’s obligations not being met in time and/or in 
full. This risk, then, can be approximated by the proportion of outstanding liabili-
ties created within a year in total liabilities due in that year. Accordingly, the local 
unit credit risk can be approximated by the ratio of outstanding liabilities in a gi-
ven year to total expenditure of local units arising in the same period3 (the default 
proxy).
Local unit credit risk – approximated in the way described above – ranged in 2008 
from 0% to 70.27% (table 2). The asymmetry coefﬁ  cient (α3) indicates a positi-
vely asymmetrical distribution of frequencies, which is as expected because of the 
nature of the statistical set. Local units are low-risk entities and the concentration 
of empirical values is reduced with a rise in credit risk. The mean value of a stati-
stical set shows an average value of approximated credit risk of local units of 
7.01%.
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics of approximated credit risk for 2008
ˉ xx min xmax σσ 2 α3 α4 N
0.0701 0.0000 0.7027 0.0952 0.0091 2.1864 6.8494 556
Source: Authors’ calculation on the basis of financial reports of local units for 2008.
Data for the explanatory variables relate to 556 municipalities and cities in Croa-
tia, and are calculated for 2008 pursuant to the ﬁ  nancial reports of the local gover-
3 In line with the modified accrual accounting system principle that is applied in Croatia (depreciation costs 
of long term non-financial assets are not recorded and expenditure are recorded on the accrual basis inde-
pendent of payment) total liabilities due within a year can (for the sake of analysis) be identified with the total 
expenditure and expenses of that year. P
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335 nment units, of the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (economic and demographic 
data) and the State Electoral Commission (data about elections of members of the 
representative bodies of local and regional government). The dependent variable 
default_proxy is calculated as the ratio of outstanding liabilities of local units to 
total liabilities due in the observed period. Many factors potentially inﬂ  uence the 
variable default_proxy and the credit risk of local units. With the objective of 
identifying the main determinants of credit risk, a group of 27 independent varia-
bles is analysed (appendix 2, table A4), which by the inductive method is reduced 
to the 11 most relevant4 independent variables (table 3).
TABLE 3
Speciﬁ  cation of selected independent variables
Variable Description Expected  effect
status
Binary variable that has the value of 1 if the local 
government unit is a city, 0 if a municipality
Negative
politika
Binary variable that has the value of 1 if the same 
political party is in power nationally and in the local 
government unit, otherwise 0
Negative
izvoz_BDP
Ratio of value of exports and GDP of the local 
government unit 
Negative
lst_nst
Ratio of population size of local unit and total 
population of Croatia
Negative
une_lst
Proportion of unemployed in total population 
of local unit
Positive
pdoh_tp Proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue Negative
nos_tp Ratio of net operating balance and operating revenue Negative
got_tr Ratio of cash and operating expenditure Negative
od_got Ratio of debt servicing and cash Positive
id_tp Ratio of direct debt and operating revenue Positive
nﬂ  _tp Ratio of net ﬁ  nancial liabilities and operating revenue Positive
Note: Value of GDP of local government units for all indicators is approximated on the basis of 
the number of inhabitants of the local unit and the per capita GDP of the county in which the 
local unit lies.
Source: Authors.
The institutional framework for local government in Croatia distinguishes local 
units that have the status of municipality or that of city. There are good reasons 
then to suppose that the actual status (of city or municipality) will a priori deter-
mine a larger or smaller credit risk of a local unit. Similarly it is supposed that in 
transition countries politics still has an important role in the ﬁ  nancing of local 
4 In a calculation of the values of the indicators of the initial group (appendix 1) it was noticed that (because 
of the values obtained) certain indicators would not be entirely relevant for an estimate of credit risk (for 
example the numerator or denominator in most cases is 0). Similarly, probably because of the absence of 
exact information about local unit GDP and reliance on estimates, indicators based on local GDP proved on 
the whole to be less relevant. P
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336 units. In line with political criteria, favoured local units can be privileged in the 
system of ﬁ  nancing, which means that their ﬁ  nancial position (and also, indirectly, 
their credit risk) can be improved to the detriment of the others. Variables related 
to demographic indicators (lst_nst and une_lst) are interesting because the local 
units in Croatia on the whole rely on revenue from shared taxes (in particular on 
income tax), which is directly related to the demographic structure of the local 
units (number and structure of employed persons) while the proportion of exports 
in GDP (izvoz_BDP) reﬂ  ects the economic development of the local unit. The 
proportion of income tax in operating revenue (pdoh_tp) shows self-sufﬁ  ciency in 
the ﬁ  nancing of a local unit (since a local unit with a greater proportion is less 
dependent on uncertain funding from the central government budget). Other indi-
cators derived from operating revenue (nos_tp, id_tp and nﬂ  _tp) show on the who-
le different aspects of the ability to ﬁ  nance liabilities and should in a very great 
measure determine local unit credit risk. Finally, liquidity indicators (got_tr and 
od_got) measure the capacity to ﬁ  nance operating expenditure and to service debt 
with the most liquid asset – cash.
TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics for 556 local government units in 2008
Variable Mean value Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev.
default_proxy 0.0701 0.0314 0.7027 0.0000 0.0952
status 0.2284 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4202
politika 0.4532 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4983
izvoz_BDP 0.1094 0.0112 3.4545 0.0000 0.2883
lst_nst 0.0018 0.0007 0.1779 0.0000 0.0081
une_lst 0.0605 0.0537 0.2228 0.0027 0.0337
pdoh_tp 0.3908 0.3895 0.7748 0.0278 0.1549
nos_tp -0.0393 -0.0261 1.8161 -0.9934 0.2153
got_tr 0.2613 0.1642 2.4765 0.0002 0.3139
od_got 1.3419 0.0000 1.0003 0.0000 7.3801
id_tp 0.0842 0.0000 1.2318 0.0000 0.1685
nﬂ  _tp -0.1313 -0.1084 1.1426 -1.8944 0.2755
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The coefﬁ  cients of correlation of the dependent variable and the eleven indepe-
ndent variables (potential determinants of local unit credit risk) are presented in 
table A5 (appendix 2). Signs of the coefﬁ  cients of correlation are on the whole in 
accordance with the expected inﬂ  uence of the observed determinants on local unit 
credit risk – except for the indicator of the political structure of local government. 
The expected negative inﬂ  uence of political compatibility between local and na-
tional government was founded on the expectation that the ruling structure would 
in the allocation of aid funding from the national budget favour the local units in 
which it had political support, which would ultimately mean the ﬁ  nancial capacity P
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337 of such local units being greater (the credit risk should be smaller). The matrix of 
correlation partially conﬁ  rmed this hypothesis because of the negative correlation 
of the variables politika and pdoh_tp (politics and income tax in operating reve-
nue). This shows that aid funding from the central government budget will proba-
bly be more often sent to local units the government of which is compatible with 
the state government making the proportion of revenue from income tax in opera-
ting revenue for those local units smaller. However, the reasons for a positive ef-
fect of political compatibility between local and national government on the credit 
risk of local units remain to be explained. One reason might be a more tolerant 
approach when “favoured” local units are not prompt in their ﬁ  nancial dealings 
because of cronyism while another might be linked with the expenditure side of 
their budgets, which is immoderate as a result of excessive demands.
4 MODEL FOR THE EVALUATION OF LOCAL UNIT CREDIT RISK 
For the modelling of local unit credit risk, a number of statistical and non-statisti-
cal tools are used, the applicability of them depending on the data set. The depe-
ndent variable (local unit bankruptcy) is, for the aforementioned reasons, not ob-
served directly. The value of the latent variable of interest (default_proxy5) is for 
a non-negligible part of the sample equal to zero (23.56%), and at the same time 
it is continuously distributed on the interval [0,1]. Because of the characteristic 
ﬁ  nancial operations as well as of the status of local government units in the public 
sector, their credit risk is expectedly relatively low and there is not a single local 
unit with the value of the default proxy equal to 1. Hence for the analysis of local 
unit credit risk a censored regression model (the Tobit model) is used (Greene, 
2008; and Wooldridge, 2006).
The credit risk of local units Y is a continuous random variable that has a positive 
value and can be zero with a positive probability. Furthermore, the calculated 
proxy of the local unit’s credit risk (default_proxy) is a latent variable in the mo-
del. This is theoretically justiﬁ  ed and has the aim of setting up the basic criteria for 
the determination of default (which could be identiﬁ  ed with local unit bankru-
ptcy). Over the course of time, this would enable the substitution of a continuou-
sly distributed variable credit risk proxy with a binary variable that would signify 
the ultimate realisation of default that either happened (1) or did not happen (0).
In cases when the variable Y is censored (restricted), the values in a given range 
are transformed into a single value. In the case of the current research, the depe-
ndent variable Y is censored to 0. If the latent variable – default_proxy – is signi-
ﬁ  ed by Y*, then the observed variable Y is equal to the latent variable in the case 
in which default_proxy>0. It has to be mentioned that, because of the (theoretical-
ly justiﬁ  ed) low value of the local units’ credit risk, no values of default_proxy=1 
are observed in the sample so the dependent variable in the model is not censored 
by the upper value of 1. 
5 Sometimes the expressions proxied credit risk or credit risk proxy are used in the article.P
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338 4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Let us suppose that for every observation Y there is a latent variable Y* which is 
described by the following regression model:
 Y i
* = β′Xi + εi,  i = 1,…,556,  (1)
where β′ = (β0, β1,..., β11) are the unknown parameters of the model, Xi = (1, X1, X2,..., X11)i, 
and the variables X1, X2,..., X11 are in order status (city or municipality), politika 
(binary variable that has the value of 1 if the political structure of the government 
at the local level is compatible with that at the national level – the same political 
party, otherwise having the value of 0), the proportion of local exports in local 
GDP (izvoz_BDP), the proportion of local population in the total population of the 
Republic of Croatia (lst_nst), the proportion of local unemployed in total local 
population (une_lst), the proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue 
(pdoh_tp), the proportion of net operating surplus in operating revenue (nos_tpi), 
the proportion of cash in operating expenditure (got_tri), the proportion of debt 
servicing in cash (od_got), the proportion of direct debt6 in operating revenue 
(id_tp), the proportion of net ﬁ  nancial liabilities in operating revenue (nﬂ  _tp), 
while εi
 are independent identically distributed normal7 random variables of zero 
expectation and variance σ2. The conditional distribution of the latent variable Y*, 
because of the normal distribution of errors εi, is also normal, with expectation 
EY* | Xi = β′Xi and variance VarY* | Xi = σ2. The results of the descriptive 
analysis of the variables Xi = (1, X1, X2,..., X11) for all local government units in 
Croatia are presented in the previous chapter (table 4).
The dependent censored variable Y – which represents the credit risk of local units 
– is modelled with the left side censored data in the following way:
Yi=
 





0 if
0 if , 0
* *
*
i i
i
Y Y
Y
.
The unknown parameters of the model β and σ are estimated by maximising the 
likelihood function  ), ( ,..., , ,
1
1 i
N
i
N y f Y Y L 

 	  ( )  or the log-likelihood function log
L (β, σ, Y1,..., YN) where y1, y2, ..., yN are the realisations of the independent and 
equally distributed random variables Yi, with N = 556 and f is the density function 
of each observation of the limited dependent variable Yi taking into account that 
6 The term direct debt relates to all liabilities for bonds and loans and does not cover contingent liabilities ari-
sing from guarantees, outstanding liabilities and other indirect debt categories.
7 In the case that errors are not normally distributed or are not homoscedastic, the estimators obtained by the 
maximum likelihood method will not be consistent. In this case the parameters will be estimated by maxi-
mum log-quasi-likelihood (QML estimator). The QML estimator is robust with respect to a false assumption 
about the distribution of the dependent variable, it is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. At 
the same time, in the event of heteroscedasticity of errors, this can be indirectly modelled in the log-quasi-
likelihood function.P
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339 only its values greater than zero are observed. Since the observed limited depe-
ndent variable cannot have a value of less than zero, the truncated distribution 
from which such values will derive refers to the part of the continuous distribution 
above zero and to the likelihood function of the discrete variable in zero. Hence 
for the estimation of the parameters it is necessary to ﬁ  nd those values of parame-
ters β and σ that maximise the following function

 
 
 0
1
'
0
1
'
1
1 1 1 ln 1
1
ln ) ( ln ,..., , ln 
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(2)
where φ is the standard normal density function, Φ is the standard normal cumu-
lative distribution function, and 1(Y>0) denotes the indicator function that assumes 
the value of 1 on the set {Y>0}, and 0 on the set {Y=0}.
Marginal effects in the Tobit model, which represent the partial effect of an indi-
vidual variable on the local unit credit risk, are not given by the values of the re-
gression coefﬁ  cients β, but by the expression (Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2006):
  j
i i
X
X Y E

 |
= 




 
	


i
j
X ' .
 
(3)
According to expression (3) it follows that the marginal effects given with the 
Tobit model are equal to the product of the marginal effects of the latent variable 
Y*, or the coefﬁ  cients β, and the proportion of non-limit observations in the sam-
ple. 
4.2 RESULTS OF ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The results of econometric analysis obtained by maximising the log-likelihood 
function (2) for the Tobit model8 are presented below. In the estimation procedure 
of the Tobit model, and in order to determine the asymptotic properties of the 
obtained estimators by the maximum likelihood method, there are two fundame-
ntal assumptions: errors are normally distributed and they are homoscedastic. In 
the ﬁ  rst step in estimating the parameters of the model, the estimators are obtained 
by maximising the log-likelihood function (the ML estimator). If the assumptions 
of the model are met (normal distribution and error homoscedasticity), the ML 
estimators are consistent, asymptotically normal and efﬁ  cient. In order to examine 
the properties and qualities of the estimator, the testing of the assumptions and 
general signiﬁ  cance of the Tobit model is carried out with the use of Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) statistics9 for testing Tobit speciﬁ  cation as compared to the alter-
8 For optimisation purposes, this research used, independently, the packages EViews 7 and Stata 10.1.
9 Critical values of the LM test are determined by the parametric bootstrap method. Testing was carried out 
with the use of Box-Cox transformations of the dependent variable. In the calculation of LM statistics and the 
critical values of the test the bctobit programme procedure of the Stata 10.1 package was used.P
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340 native to the model that is not linear in its explanatory variables and contains an 
error that can be heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed. The test rejects the 
zero hypothesis, showing that the Tobit speciﬁ  cation of the model assumptions is 
not suitable for consistent estimation of the parameters. In order to obtain consi-
stent estimators the heteroscedasticity problem was addressed with direct model-
ling of heteroscedasticity using an exponential function in the log-likelihood fun-
ction with σi = e˜ xi γ, where, γ = (γ0, γ1,..., γ9)’ and  ˜ Xi = (1, X1, X2, X3, X5, X6, X8, X9, 
X10, X11).10 If the errors are not normally distributed, the problem is usually much 
more demanding for a Tobit model as compared with linear models, and for the 
purpose of its solution alternative estimates are proposed, as are various methods 
for testing such, potentially wrong, speciﬁ  cations of the model. Thus, in a second 
step of the estimating procedure, the parameters will be estimated by maximising 
the quasi log-likelihood function (QML), since quasi maximum likelihood esti-
mator is robust with respect to a false assumption about error or dependent varia-
ble distribution. In this way, model estimators are obtained that are consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed. However, the QML estimator is not asymp-
totically efﬁ  cient, and the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) numerical algori-
thm is used for the purpose of estimating the variance of the maximum log-like-
lihood estimator when the initial model is not accurately speciﬁ  ed  (Greene, 
2008)11.
Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the Tobit regression model, the corre-
sponding marginal effects and the corresponding standard errors. The table also 
gives the estimators obtained by the least squares method (OLS), in spite of their 
lack of consistency, since in empirical analysis it can be seen that the ML estima-
tors can be obtained as a ratio of OLS estimators and the proportion of non-limit 
observations in the sample.12 In addition, marginal effects for variables in the mo-
del that did not prove to be statistically signiﬁ  cant have been excluded from the 
table. 
In order to determine the marginal effects of explanatory variables on local unit 
credit risk it is necessary to calculate the adjustment factor  




 
	
 i X '
 for coefﬁ  -
cients in the case of continuous explanatory variables Xi (Greene, 2008).13 For di-
10 The variables X4 and X7, that is the percentage of local population in total population and the proportion 
of net operating surplus were removed from the modelling of variance since by their inclusion the numeri-
cal algorithm for the search of maximum function did not converge. Hence one variable at a time was exclu-
ded from the demographic structure (X4 and X5) and one of the indicators derived from operating revenue 
(X7, X10 and X11).
11 For estimating the variance using the BHHH algorithm, STATA 10.1 and EViews7 were used independently; 
the initial conditions were specified by programme support and not modified in the special case. 
12 The results obtained by the OLS estimation, aimed at obtaining an outline insight into the sensitivity of the 
connection between local unit credit risk and its potential determinants, might indicate an initial guideline 
with respect to this and enable the monitoring of any possible improvements in the form of results obtained 
by the analysis of some other model, as well as the estimating procedure. 
13 The adjustment factor will be closer to the value of 1 when there are less observations for which Yi=0 (there 
is no credit risk for a local unit, i.e. it is equal to zero). In the observed sample for 23.56% of local units the 
approximated credit risk is equivalent to zero. P
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341 screet explanatory variables – like the political structure of the government – the 
determination of marginal effects is not entirely simple, although an approxima-
tion with the use of an adjustment factor has proved to be very useful (Wooldri-
dge, 2006). For the sake of determining the marginal effect of the political structure 
of government – represented in the model by a binary variable – on local unit 
credit risk, the expected credit risk will be calculated for both possible values of 
the variable politika={0,1} and the arithmetical means of the remaining signiﬁ  -
cant variables in the model.
TABLE 5
Estimated parameters, corresponding marginal effects for Tobit regression
models and corresponding standard errors
Independent 
variable
Linear regression Tobit regression
Marginal effect Coefﬁ  cient Marginal effect Heteroscedasticity γ
konstanta
0.11341
(0.01398)
0.11945
(0.01585)
–
-1.92925
(0.18754)
politika
0.02034
(0.00778)
0.03196
(0.01202)
0.02072
(0.00674)
0.06310*
(0.09789)
pdoh_tp
-0.11327
(0.02312)
-0.14739
(0.02726)
-0.10986
(0.02212)
-0.79302)
(0.33011)
nos_tp
-0.0813
(0.02031)
-0.08130
(0.02065)
-0.06244
(0.01619)
–
nﬂ  _tp
0.09054
(0.03276)
0.10141
(0.02494)
0.06975
(0.02447)
0.34842*
(0.41046)
od_got
0.00086
(0.00038)
0.00094
(0.00022)
0.00063
(0.00015)
-0.02438)
(0.01129)
id_tp
-0.05996*
(0.03710)
-0.08766
(0.03361)
-0.05860
(0.02247)
0.02857*
(0.52075)
status
-0.014052*
(0.00885)
-0.01432*
(0.01044)
–
-0.20347*
(0.14148)
izvoz_BDP
-0.00403*
(0.00938)
-0.00269*
(0.01168)
–
-0.08131*
(0.17230)
lst_nst
-0.102167*
(0.17733)
0.12805*
(0.12193)
––
une_lst
-0.07435*
(0.10998)
-0.09160*
(0.13094)
–
-1.14712*
(1.18411)
got_tr
0.04827*
(0.03886)
0.00958*
(0.02480)
–
0.45402*
(0.27288)
R2           10.76% – – –
Log-quasi likelihood 259.14428 – –
* Not statistically significant for usual significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The obtained marginal effect comes to 0.02072 and represents the effect of the 
local units’ government political structure on credit risk – all other variables of P
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342 interest being constant14. In other words, if the same political party is in power at 
local and at national level, it is expected that there will be an increase of the esti-
mated credit risk of 2.1 percentage points. A positive correlation of the political 
structure of the government and credit risk reveals the fact that the ﬁ  nancial ope-
rations of local units in Croatia are subject to political inﬂ  uence, i.e. that the irre-
gular meeting of ﬁ  nancial liabilities of some local government units is heightened 
from political reasons. The reasons for which local governments that are politi-
cally compatible to central government are more irregular in meeting their ﬁ  na-
ncial liabilities are unclear, although some of the possible causes of this phenome-
non are explained in chapter 3.
The proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue (pdoh_tp) shows the 
capacity of a local unit to collect revenue from its own sources, i.e. it shows its 
ﬁ  scal capacity. In general, ﬁ  scal capacity is one of the measures of local unit ﬁ  na-
ncial stability, so greater ﬁ  scal capacity results in smaller credit risk (as borne out 
by the results of econometric analysis). The ratio of net operating balance and 
operating revenue (nos_tp) is also negatively correlated with credit risk, for a 
greater net operating balance shows a surplus of revenue to operating expenditure. 
The ratios of debt servicing and cash (od_got) and net ﬁ  nancial liabilities and 
operating revenue (nﬂ  _tp) indicate debt burden, i.e. the capacity of servicing debt 
annuities in cash and the possibility of ﬁ  nancing surplus ﬁ  nancial liabilities over 
ﬁ  nancial assets from regular activities (operating revenue). Larger values of these 
variables indicate greater exposure to debt and it is logical that as they rise, the 
value of credit risk also rises. Finally, the ratio of direct debt and operating reve-
nue (id_tp) reﬂ  ects the capacity to ﬁ  nance direct debt with operating revenue but 
the sign of the coefﬁ  cient for this indicator is not entirely logical, i.e. a completely 
opposite sign was expected because a larger debt in proportion to operating reve-
nue should result in greater credit risk.
4.3   RELATIONSHIP OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED VALUES OF CREDIT 
RISK
With the aim of examining the ﬁ  tting of the local unit credit risk model, the values 
of the default_proxy variable (approximation of credit risk, i.e. proportion of out-
standing due liabilities in total due liabilities) will be compared with those pre-
dicted by the Tobit model for both characteristics of the political structure of local 
government (politika={0,1}). The values of the variables pdoh_tp, nos_tp, nﬂ  _tp, 
od_got and id_tp are given for each value of the variable of interest. The predicted 
values for the default_proxy are calculated with the use of the relation (Wooldri-
dge, 2006):
14 Instead of evaluation in the arithmetic means of the explanatory variables, the marginal effect can be calcu-
lated for each value of the explanatory variables in the first step, and then finding the arithmetical mean of 
the obtained values. The value of the marginal effect of the explanatory variable in this case almost equals 
the value given in table 6.P
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in the estimated values of the corresponding coefﬁ  cients.
Bearing in mind the fact that the marginal effect of the proportion of revenue from 
income tax in operating revenue in the Tobit model is by far the greatest, and in 
addition the frequency range of this variable is fairly broad (from 2.78% to 
77.48%), the possible values of the proportion of revenue from income tax are 
divided into 10 equidistant categories. For each category of the proportion of re-
venue from income tax in operating revenue there are subsamples of real and 
predicted values of the default_proxy variable for which the mean value and the 
median in the corresponding subsample are calculated. In this way, it is possible 
to graphically display the predictive power of the Tobit model. Graph 1 shows the 
real and predicted values of the average credit risk of local government units. The 
variable default_proxy marks the average of observed values for the approxima-
tion of credit risk within individual categories. The variables prilagođen_def_pro-
xy_vlast and prilagođen_def_proxy in the Tobit model indicate the predicted va-
lues of credit risk calculated in the mean values of the ascertained determinants in 
the case of compatibility and of incompatibility of the political structure of local 
and national government. 
GRAPH 1
Real and predicted values of the average credit risk of local units
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The expected values of credit risk in the case of political compatibility between 
local and national government (table 6) are on average above the observed values 
of the default_proxy variables for all categories of the proportion of income tax 
revenue in operating revenue. In the case of political incompatibility of local and 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10
Personal income tax
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
 def_proxy      prilagođen_def_proxy_vlast      prilagođen_def_proxyP
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344 national government, the situation is considerably different – the expected values 
of credit risk for the Tobit model on the whole ﬂ  uctuate around the existing de-
fault_proxy values.15
TABLE 6
Within-sample test of prediction strength in the mean value
KN default_proxy ABCD
1 21 0.0735 0.1313 0.1051 0.1348 0.1077
2 30 0.0949 0.1210 0.0957 0.1237 0.0976
3 61 0.1158 0.1163 0.0913 0.1226 0.0965
4 78 0.0824 0.1054 0.0814 0.1061 0.0817
5 105 0.0667 0.0961 0.0733 0.1012 0.0773
6 92 0.0710 0.0873 0.0658 0.0892 0.0669
7 68 0.0500 0.0813 0.0604 0.0800 0.0590
8 60 0.0419 0.0763 0.0561 0.0793 0.0584
9 37 0.0382 0.0697 0.0504 0.0697 0.0503
10 4 0.0545 0.0625 0.0445 0.0584 0.0411
Note: K – category of proportion of income tax; N – number of observations; A – prediction 
for default_proxy ˆ Yi (ˉ x, politika = 1); B – prediction for default_proxy ˆ Yi (ˉ x, politika = 0);
C – prediction for default_proxy ˆ Yi (m, politika = 1); D – prediction for default_proxy ˆ Yi (m, 
politika = 0).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
5 CONCLUSION
In Croatian scientiﬁ  c and expert literature, the determinants of the credit risk of 
local government units have not been investigated. The Croatian legislative back-
ground does not allow local units to go into bankruptcy, which makes it more 
difﬁ  cult to investigate their credit risk. In this paper a measure for the approxima-
tion of credit risk of local units is deﬁ  ned (default proxy) as ratio of outstanding 
liabilities to all due liabilities in a given period, pursuant to which the existing 
credit risk of local units is quantiﬁ  ed. Because of the characteristics of the depe-
ndent variable (default_proxy), an appropriate method for the estimation of the 
model’s parameters is selected. The Tobit model is used to show the effect of the 
political compatibility of local and national government, the proportion of income 
tax in operating revenue, the ratio of net operating balance and operating revenue, 
of the net ﬁ  nancial liabilities and the operating revenue, and of direct debt and 
operating revenue, as well as debt servicing and cash on the local unit credit risk. 
The main constraint on the research is the absence of any historical data about 
local unit bankruptcy, which should be expressed by a binary variable. Instead of 
an observed binary variable (which would enable the estimation of credit risk with 
the application of a logit or a probit model) the approximation of credit risk (the 
15 According to the authors’ calculation, completely analogous conclusions are obtained in the case of an ana-
lysis of the predictive power of Tobit models based on the values of the median m.P
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345 default_proxy) which assumes continuous values in the interval [0,1], has been 
used. Apart from that, there are no publicly available data about the factors of lo-
cal unit credit risk such as institutional framework, economic structure, governa-
nce and administration. In future research it remains to test the impact of other 
independent variables on local unit credit risk and resolve the problem of the de-
pendent variable. The problem of the dependent variable could be solved by deter-
mining the critical value of the proposed approximation of credit risk on the basis 
of which local units could be categorised into risk groups, according to which the 
dependent variable might be directly observed and take on binary values. Future 
research might test out the impact of the mentioned indicators on local unit credit 
risk with the use of other methods – preferably from the realm of artiﬁ  cial intelli-
gence.
The proposed model for the estimation of local unit credit risk could be improved. 
However, in this work local unit credit risk in Croatia is being studied for the ﬁ  rst 
time, and it could be a good point of departure for further research. In addition, the 
results could be useful to the Ministry of Finance in issuing guarantees and giving 
consent for local unit borrowing and for the analysis of ﬁ  scal risks. The model of 
estimated local unit credit risk could be used as a good foundation for the calcula-
tion of the required yield on the local government bonds and the interest rates on 
local unit loans. P
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346 APPENDIX 1 
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL UNIT CREDIT RISK 
TABLE A1
Most frequently used indicators by Standard & Poor’s
1) Economy 4) Financial ﬂ  exibility
1.1 Demographic structure  4.1 Legislative constraints
Population (total and as % 
of total)
4.2 Political constraints
Population growth rate
4.3   Limited ﬂ  exibility because of planned 
spending
Old and young population 
(as % of total)
4.4   Other potential pressures and one-off 
revenue
1.2 Economic structure
Autonomous revenue as % of operating 
revenue
GDP (nominal)
Capital expenditure as % of total 
expenditure
GDP (production) and sectoral 
distribution of employees
Expenditure on labour as % of operating 
expenditure
Rates of employment and 
unemployment
Rise in operating expenditure
Employment at the biggest 
employers
Rise in operating revenue
1.3 Wealth 5) Budgeting
Per capita GDP Operating balance as % of operating revenue
Per capita GDP as % of national 
or regional average (e.g. EU-27)
Balance after capital expenditure as % of 
total revenue
1.4 Growth possibility
Balance after borrowing as % of total reve-
nue
Real GDP growth 6) Liquidity and debt management
Exports as % of GDP and ex-
port growth
6.1 Analysis of liquidity
Rise in investments 
Cash and liquid assets as % of debt 
repayment
2) Support and predictability
Cash, liquid assets and loans as 
% of debt repayment
2.1 Predictability
Debt maturing within 12 months as 
% of liquid assets and loans
2.2   Equilibrium of revenue and
expenditure
Cash and liquid assets as % of operating 
expenditure
2.3   Transparency and accountability
Cash surplus (before interest) as % of 
expenditure on interest
2.4 Fiscal policy Liabilities as % of total expenditure
2.5 Exceptional support Claims as % of total revenue
3)   Administration and institutional 
framework
6.2 Debt management
3.1 Administrative sophistication Structure of debt
3.2 Institutional legitimacy Use of derivativesP
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347 7) Debt burden 8) Non-balance sheet liabilities 
Expenditure on interest as 
% of operating revenue
8.1 Financial health of public corporations 
Debt repayment as % of 
operating revenue
8.2 Quasi-governmental programs
Direct debt as % of operating 
expenditure
8.3 Public-private partnership
Net direct debt as % of 
operating revenue
8.4 Bailouts of private corporations
Net (tax covered) debt as % of 
consolidated operating revenue
Net ﬁ  nancial liabilities as % of 
consolidated operating revenue
Direct debt as % of local GDP
Total local debt as % of total 
local revenue
Total debt (including guarantees) 
as % of operating revenue
Source: Authors’ systematisation on the basis of Standard &Poor’s (2007).P
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348 TABLE A2
Most frequently used indicators by Moody’s
1) Economic environment 5) Debt
Per capita GDP Total direct and indirect debt (nominal)
GDP volatility Net direct and indirect debt (nominal)
Governmental efﬁ  ciency index Net direct and indirect debt per capita
2) Institutional framework Net direct and indirect debt as % of GDP
Predictability, stability, 
responsibility
Net direct and indirect debt as % of operating 
revenue
Fiscal ﬂ  exibility (own sources 
of revenue)
Net direct and indirect debt as % of total 
revenue
Fiscal ﬂ  exibility (spending)
Direct debt in foreign currency as % of direct 
debt
Fiscal adequacy (borrowing) Short-term direct debt as % of direct debt
3) Management
Short term direct debt and long-term direct debt 
with variable interest rate as % of direct debt
Fiscal management
Average weighted maturity of direct debt 
(in years)
Investment and debt 
management 
6) Finances
Transparency and information 
publication
Discretionary own source revenue as % 
of operating revenue
Institutional capacity
Intergovernmental transfers as % of operating 
expenditure
4) Economic fundamentals Earmarked revenue as % of operating revenue
Per capita GDP Interest payments as % of operating revenue
Population Debt service as % of total revenue
GDP (nominal) Net operating surplus as % of total revenue
Per capita GDP Cash ﬁ  nancing surplus as % of total revenue
Per capita GDP as % of 
national average
Gross borrowing need as % of total revenue
Per capita GDP (PPP) Total per capita expenditure (nominal)
Real GDP (% change) Total expenditure as % of GDP
Unemployment (%) Primary balance as % of operating revenue
National unemployment Gross operating balance as % of revenue
Net operating balance as % of operating 
revenue
Degree of own ﬁ  nancing
Capital spending as % of total expenditure
Difference of compound (ﬁ  ve-year) annual 
growth rate of total revenue and total 
expenditure
Net working capital as % of total expenditure
Source: Authors’ systematisation after Moody’s (2008).P
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349 TABLE A3
Most frequently used indicators by Fitch Ratings
1) Institutional framework 3) Finances
Relation between administrative units Revenue analysis
Centralisation/decentralisation Expenditure analysis
Revenue structure
Trends in operating and current 
margins
Fiscal equalisation system State of reserves
Flexibility of ﬁ  nancial arrangements be-
tween local unit and central government
Liquidity
Kind of local government unit account-
ability
4) Governance and administration
Orientation to investment or operations Institutional policies
Public functions in purview of local unit Budgetary practice
Legal framework Financial reporting and accountancy
Degree of autonomy Political, tax and labour environment
Inﬂ  exibility of expenditure Revenue and expenditure constraints
Demand for capital investment 5) Economy
Strength of institutional framework Main economic generators
2) Debt and long-term liabilities Employment
Indicators of indebtedness and the trends Income and wealth
Future needs for capital and debt Other demographic factors
Debt structure Tax burden
Financing of pensions and similar 
payments
Indirect risks and contingent liabilities
Source: Authors’ systematisation after Fitch Ratings (2010).P
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350 APPENDIX 2 
POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT CREDIT 
RISK IN CROATIA
TABLE A4
Initial set of independent variables covered in the research
No. Variable Description
1 status
Binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the local unit has the 
status of city, 0 if of municipality
2 politika
Binary variable that assumes the value of 1 if the same political 
party is in power nationally and locally, otherwise 0
3 izvoz_BDP Ratio of value of exports and GDP of local unit
4 LBDP_NBDP Ratio of local and national GDP per capita
5 BDP_st Local GDP per capita of local unit
6 lst_nst
Ratio of population size of local unit and total population size 
of Croatia
7 une_lst
Proportion of unemployed in total local government unit 
population
8 vp_tp
Share of own source revenue (from taxation and administrative 
charges) in operating revenue
9 pom_tp Ratio of transfers and operating revenue
10 pdoh_tp Proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue
11 nos_tp Ratio of net operating balance and operating revenue
12 tr_tp Ratio of operating expenditure and operating revenue
13 tp_up Proportion of operating revenue in total revenue
14 ur_up Ratio of total expenditure and total revenue
15 nok_ur Ratio of net working capital and total expenditure
16 ur_st Total expenditure per capita of the local unit 
17 ur_BDP Ratio of total revenue and GDP of local unit
18 ki_ko Ratio of current assets and current liabilities
19 got_tr Ratio of cash and operating expenditure
20 od_tp Ratio of debt service and operating revenue
21 od_got Ratio of debt service and cash
22 id_ui Ratio of direct debt and total assets
23 id_tp Ratio of direct debt and operating revenue
24 nﬂ  _tp Ratio of net ﬁ  nancial liabilities and operating expenditure
25 id_BDP Ratio of direct debt and GDP of local unit
26 id_st Direct debt per capita of local government unit 
27 id_up Ratio of direct debt and total revenue
Note: Value of GDP of local government units for all indicators is approximated on the basis of 
the number of inhabitants of the local unit and the per capita GDP of the county in which the 
local unit lies.
Source: Authors.P
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